ON-BOARD SECURITY -- ARE
WE THERE YET?
By
Ken Cubbin
In the first half of 2004, numerous flights destined for U.S. major cities
from Europe were canceled due to perceived terrorist threats. Intelligence authorities, based on increased chatter and other
threat information, speculated that terrorists might try to smuggle improvised explosive devices (IED), biological weapons,
or radiological materials on-board international jetliners. Faced with specific threat information airlines had little option
but to cancel affected flights. However, passengers intended for those flights were apparently not put off by the disruptions.
When interviewed by TV reporters, most people were stoic in their attitude towards airline travel and expressed faith in airport
security procedures. But is their faith misplaced?
SOME PUNDITS THINK SO
Aviation security concerns can be placed under two broad categories: persons
and objects. Although there is some overlap passenger profiling, biometric tracking, training, intelligence gathering, and
access to airplanes fall under the category of persons while the category of objects includes everything from guns, knives,
explosives, chemical, biological, and radiological agents, and the threat from shoulder-fired missiles (SAMS).
Even though billions of dollars have been spent on upgrading aviation security,
Ken Cubbin, airline security consultant and author of Survival Tactics for Airline Passengers warns, airport perimeters, cargo,
and cockpits are still vulnerable to attack. Dawn Deeks, spokesperson for the Association of Flight Attendants (AFA), also
worries that hijackers might beat the system and get on-board an airliner. Passengers routinely pass through airport screening
with prohibited items, she says. Hijackers could get on-board and flight attendants are inadequately trained and equipped
to deal with them. The Coalition of Airline Pilots (CAPA) echoes these sentiments. CAPA issued a report card on airline security
in which the association gave a B, its highest rating, for reinforced cockpits, and passenger bag checking, but every other
facet of security was rated from C to F.
While ultimately all security efforts affect passenger safety, in this article
we will look specifically at the status of on-board security.
CARGO
According to the General Accounting Office (GAO), roughly 22% of air cargo
shipped in the U.S. is carried on passenger airplanes. Currently most cargo is not physically inspected; however, airlines
do load unchecked cargo unless packages come from known shippers. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is in the
process of developing a strategic plan that would improve cargo safety. Improvements expected include aggressive development
of explosive detection technology, prescreening of suspicious cargo, and improvement of the current Known-Shipper program.
However, concern that terrorist groups might be planning an attack like the bomb that brought down Pan Am Flight 103 over
Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988, has led to a call for more action.
Captain Jay Norelius, Chairman of the Allied Pilots Association National
Security Committee, has been quoted as saying that his committee would like to see all cargo physically inspected before shipment.
Such action might not only deter terrorists planting explosives, but would eliminate the possibility of shipping human cargo.
In September, 2003, a man sealed himself in a box that was then shipped from New York to Dallas, Texas. This raised concerns
about terrorists using this method to gain access to cargo airplanes with the intent of taking control after takeoff and committing
another atrocity like 9/11. Late 2003, Logan International Airport in Boston, Massachusetts, was in the middle of a pilot
program to electronically screen all cargo loaded on passenger jets. However, what if all attempts to keep bombs off airplanes
fail?
Reinforcing cargo holds and/or reinforcing cargo airframes on passenger jets
might also reduce the danger from explosives. While regulatory authorities consider requirements to fortify cargo areas several
companies have developed blast-proof baggage containers. These containers may add another layer of security while alleviating
the need to slow down the process of cargo handling. One company, Telair International, has developed Hardened Unit Load Devices
(HULDs) that have successfully completed TSA/FAA blast tests. The tests, conducted in actual Boeing 747 fuselage sections,
proved that Telairs HULDs can withstand explosions and contain post-event fires. Telair
International sales manager, Chris Lorenson, laments, Although orders for HULDs have been trialed by passenger carriers most
of our recent orders are for VIP aircraft applications. Telair claims that their product could augment the Known Shipper program
by allowing airlines to ship questionable cargo in HULDs. Unfortunately, airlines and regulators seem reticent to embrace
this technology.
SAM threat
The Department of Homeland Security estimates that 27 terrorist organizations
may have access to some of the 750,000 SAMs thought to be in circulation or held in defense stockpiles throughout the world.
Al Qaeda alone may have 500 or more. Depending on the type of missile aircraft may be vulnerable to attack up to 3 miles and
5,000 feet from airports. Most airports in the U.S.A. and Europe are amid largely populated areas with few, if any, perimeter
defenses. The threat of a commercial airliner being attacked in this manner is certainly possible
For example, terrorists fired two SAMs at an Arkia Airlines B-757-300 on
takeoff from Mombasa, Kenya in late 2002. Fortunately both missiles missed their target. As a consequence of this attack Israel
then spent $60 million fitting electronic countermeasure equipment to its international fleet of aircraft. Worried that a
similar attack might be mounted against U.S. registered airliners California Senator, Barbara Boxer, called for similar action
in the U.S. As a consequence of Boxers legislation the Department of Homeland Security awarded contracts to several companies
to develop systems to protect jets from missile attacks. British Airways, Europes
largest carrier, is also exploring possible methods of protecting its commercial fleet from SAM attacks.
But some pundits worry whether the risk is significant enough to spend the
estimated $7.5 billion it would cost to fit anti-missile systems to all 3,800 U.S. registered jets. Another concern is will
these defense mechanisms work? George Friedman, chairman of Stratfor, an intelligence organization in Austin, Texas, remarked
to journalists that military jets often use flares and violent maneuvers to avoid being hit by heat-seeking missiles. He pointed
out that violent maneuvers are almost impossible to execute on passenger jets. Another problem is that later missiles are
relatively easy to reprogram to ignore a new family of flares. Better, he says, to concentrate on infiltrating the international
arms market to head off terrorist group acquisition of SAMs.
Such action reaped rewards in 2003 when an FBI/Russian Intelligence sting
operation nabbed a British arms dealer who agreed to sell a Russian SAM to FBI agents posing as terrorists. The man claimed
to have sold weapons to Al Qaeda in the past. If his claims are true then the threat of SAM attacks on commercial jetliners
is very real.
What if a SAM attack occurred?
In late 2003, and early 2004, SAMs struck two airplanes operating in the
Middle East. One aircraft was a U.S.A.F. C-5A large military transport, and the other a DHL A300. Both aircraft suffered significant
damage, but landed safely. These cases suggest that if a large commercial jetliner were struck by a SAM while taking off or
landing the damage incurred might not be catastrophic. However, if the attack were on a smaller jet disaster may ensue.
Fuel Tank vapors
In 2004, the FAA also plans to call for all 3,800 U.S. commercial jets to
be fitted with systems to eliminate oxygen from fuel tanks. The use of nitrogen to make air inside fuel tanks inert will prevent
an airliner from suffering major airframe damage due to fuel-air explosions, such as the event that brought down TWA 800 in
1996, even if the ignition source comes from a red-hot fragment of detonated shrapnel. The estimated cost of this upgrade
is around $700 million. However, it will take several years before all passenger jets are modified.
Whether an aircraft is destroyed by a SAM or not may not be crucial for terrorists
to consider the attack successful. The psychological effect of any attack on commercial aviation, particularly on domestic
soil, would definitely erode the traveling publics sense of security. Passengers would likely then avoid air travel, airlines
would reduce services, commerce would decline, and western economies would stagnate.
Currently, a number of companies in the U.S. and Europe are developing on-board
missile defense systems that might protect commercial airliners. However, according to reported statements from Rafi Ron,
an Israeli aviation security expert and president of New Age Security Solutions, the technology will be ready long before
politicians and airlines have decided on how to allocate money and install the systems. In other words, airlines and politicians
will continue to procrastinate and hope that such an attack will be prevented from happening by intelligence agencies diligence.
Aircraft cabins
Tests conducted at various major airports in the U.S. have revealed significant
failure rates of airport screeners ability to detect guns, knives and box cutters on people or in their carryon luggage. To
make matters worse current scanners cannot detect weapons made of synthetic material, explosives, bacterial, chemical or radiological
substances carried on or inside a persons body. To show how easy airport scanners can be fooled in mid-2003 a U.S. college
student smuggled box cutters and modeling clay onto two flights. He hid the items in the bathroom of a B-737 that flew for
two weeks without the dangerous items being detected. While TSA officials denigrated, and later prosecuted, the man for his
reckless behavior little action was done to rectify security lapses that had allowed the transgression. Such items might also
be planted on-board a passenger jet by an airport worker.
Despite the opportunity for terrorists to mount another deadly attack, Deeks
says that most passengers naively believe that flight attendants are trained to identify and combat terrorists. Nothing could
be further from the truth, she says. More than two years after 9/11 flight attendants are not any better trained to deal with
terrorists than they were before the attacks. She rates current on-board security as abysmal, and says that legislation to
mandate flight attendant training in threat recognition, negotiation skills, and physical defense, has been thwarted at every
turn by airlines reticence to bear the cost. While air marshals might assist flight attendants to put down a hijacking attempt,
she adds, they are not on every flight.
Pilots, who are sequestered in cockpits and forbidden from opening the cockpit
door under any threat from the cabin, cannot help flight attendants that might be left to you, the passenger. Cubbin says
that every passenger should be aware of how he or she can help flight attendants. In my book I show how any person can learn
a few simple, but effective, martial arts techniques that might save their life and the lives of other passengers.
Air marshals
The Federal Air Marshal Program is an evolution of the Sky Marshal program
of the 1970s. Marshals are trained to use whatever force is necessary to intercede and terminate hijackings. Following 9/11
many more air marshals were trained and brought into service to protect high-risk flights. Training is rigorous, comprehensive
and continuous. Air marshals carry special ammunition that will not penetrate the pressurized cabin but will only use deadly
force as a last resort.
The program has come under attack lately due to a number of marshals who
have resigned. Long flights, too little rest, and dress codes that marshals say could help terrorists identify them have caused
some dissatisfaction among the ranks. Other incidents where a marshal was removed from a flight after smelling of alcohol,
an accidental discharge of a marshals weapon in a Las Vegas hotel room, and an unbelievable case where a marshal left his
weapon in a lavatory on board a United Airlines flight, have caused some to wonder whether training standards have slipped
with the urgent demand to add more air marshals.
When the Department of Homeland Security demanded that certain foreign carriers
put air marshals on flights subject to high alerts, European pilots unions balked. While European airlines fret about placing
armed marshals on-board flights, historical evidence shows that such action is not only a deterrent to terrorists, but also
an effective means of ending attempts to take over a plane. In November, 2002, a terrorist who threatened a flight attendant
and rushed the cockpit of an El Al flight enroute from Tel Aviv to Istanbul, Turkey, was overpowered and disarmed quickly
by on-board Israeli security guards. This event occurred on the most safety-conscious airline in the world, and still a passenger
managed to board the airplane with a knife. This seems to suggest that having air marshals on-board is a good idea. It also
underlines the fact that it is nearly impossible to stop would-be terrorists from smuggling weapons on-board.
The threat of biochemical agents
In 1995 a religious sect attacked morning commuters on a Tokyo subway with
deadly Serin gas. Eleven people died and over 5,000 were injured. Other chemical weapons that might be used in a terrorist
attack include blistering agents, such as Chlorine, and choking agents, such as Mustard gas. On the biological front the main
threats come from Ricin, Anthrax, Smallpox, Botulism, and Bubonic Plague. None of these options is pretty, but most are difficult
to transmit, and the most deadly difficult to obtain.
There is some good news. Although there is a degree of recycling of cabin
air on modern jetliners the entire cabin atmosphere is replaced with outside air every 2 to 6 minutes. Also, if alerted of
a problem, pilots could eliminate the cabin pressure quickly to dispel all agents overboard. Passengers could also don oxygen
masks to help alleviate inhalation dangers.
Even if passengers are infected many of the biological viruses are treatable
with antibiotics. Smallpox, however, is the exception. There is no known effective treatment of this highly infectious disease
that kills 30% of those infected. While the Variola virus that causes Smallpox can be transmitted through an infected persons
breath that person is only infectious when running a fever in excess of 101 degrees Fahrenheit. He or she must also have developed
the telltale rash that precedes the forming of blisters. In other words when a terrorist is infectious he would be too sick
to travel. There are also only two known stockpiles of the Variola virus, one in Russian and the other in the U.S. A study
by the CDC in the U.S. predicted that with early detection, quarantining affected persons, and selective immunization, an
outbreak of Smallpox could be contained. While there would be significant casualties they would be nowhere near the number
previously feared.
The bad news is that there is little than can be done to protect passengers
from an attack of this ilk. No on-board systems can stop a terrorist from spreading a biochemical weapon. In this regard all
our hope is placed in intelligence agencies being successful in keeping such substances out of terrorists hands.
Cameras
A number of companies, including AD Aerospace and Goodrich, have developed
cameras that can be installed in the cabin and connected to screens in the cockpit. In a simple system installation pilots
can view who is outside the cockpit door. While more complex systems have the ability of transmitting real-time video to ground
stations.
AD Aerospaces system, FlightVu, consists of a number of cameras in the cabin,
connected to live LCD screens in the cockpit and video recorder/servers. According to Rob Davis, AD Aerospaces marketing manager,
FlightVu allows pilots to visually check who is outside the cockpit door. This, he says, helps eliminate the vulnerability
of the flight deck when pilots need to exit and re-enter the cockpit to use the lavatory. The pilot would know immediately
if a terrorist were trying to coerce a crew member into gaining entry into the cockpit. The system can also record events
in the cabin on a digital video server and images can be linked to electronic flight bag systems. The digital recorder can
be activated by one of several alarm buttons in the cabin and will record events from 2 minutes before button activation until
reset. FlightVu Witness system covers the whole cabin and recording of events are admissible in court as evidence in later
prosecution, says Davis.
AD Aerospace customers include easyJet, Britannia Airways, Hapag Lloyd, MyTravel,
GB Airways, bmi, Astraeus, JetBlue, and Continental Airlines. Boeing is currently evaluating AD Aerospaces system, along with
similar systems, for retrofitting Boeing 777, 767, 747 and 737 series airplanes.
AD Aerospace also has a system called CargoVu where real-time visual images
of cargo holds are transmitted to the cockpit indicator. Swissair has purchased and installed CargoVu in some of its airplanes.
Several cargo operators are considering installing this system.
British Airways selected Goodrichs system for video surveillance of cockpit
doors on its long-haul aircraft, as did Virgin Atlantic. Goodrich was also chosen by Airbus to supply video surveillance systems
on production aircraft. Goodrich systems have been certified for Boeing 747-400, 767, and 777 series airplanes.
Pilots may have a number of other actions they can take to help thwart any
terrorist attacks or air rage episodes they witness via the video system. For example, they could radically change pitch or
roll attitude to unbalance attackers, or they might depressurize the cabin to prevent the terrorists from moving around. However,
these are extreme measures that might also jeopardize the well-being of innocent passengers; therefore, they would only be
used in extreme circumstances. Having a visual display of what is happening in the cabin enables pilots to judge what actions
to take.
COCKPIT
If all security precautions fail to keep terrorists off a jetliner, unified
passenger/crew resistance, fortified cockpits, and at least in the U.S. armed pilots, are the last bastions of defense. Among
the threats detected early in 2004, intelligence agencies learned that terrorists might try and smuggle IED components on-board
a passenger jet, assemble a bomb in a forward lavatory and blast their way into the cockpit. We already know that passengers
might successfully smuggle such components on-board. A few airlines have also reported apparent tampering with components
in the forward lavatory. Early March 2004, CIA Director, George Tenet, testified before the Senate Intelligence Community.
He warned that al Qaeda is actively seeking biochemical and nuclear weapons, and trying to recruit pilots for future hijackings.
So, is the cockpit safe?
Fortified doors
In an 18 month period Boeing, along with its approved suppliers, C&D
Aerospace and Aim Aviation, designed, received FAA certification, manufactured, and fitted more than 4,300 enhanced security
cockpit door kits to 76 airlines worldwide. Airbus Industrie accomplished a similar feat on its family of airplanes. Other
companies that offer cockpit security doors include National Aircraft Services Inc. (NASI), and Quiet Wing Corporation. In
all more than 10,000 enhanced security doors have been installed on airliners around the world.
The intent of fortified cockpit doors is to prevent the entry of persons,
or sufficiently delay entry, until other actions can be taken to overcome them.
Part 25 of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations, dictates that doors must:
1. Resist forcible intrusion of unauthorized persons and be capable of withstanding
impacts of 300 Joules (221.3 foot-pounds) at the critical locations on the door, as well as a 250 pound (1113 Newtons) constant
tensile load on the knob or handle, and
2. Resist penetration by small arms fire and fragmentation
devices to a level equivalent to level 111a of the National Institute of Justice Standard (NIJ) 0101.04
Doors are fortified using a
variety of materials including S-2 Glass, Kevlar, and various other laminated materials, but each must still meet emergency
egress requirements, ventilation needs and pilot rescue access.
But are fortified cockpit doors enough to keep out terrorists?
No, says Larry Martens, president of Crupax Security, an innovative firm
based in Ottawa, Canada. If a terrorist were ready to attack when the cockpit door is opened, he could gain access to the
cockpit very quickly and lock the door behind him thereby screening himself from attack by air marshals or passengers. Martens
may not be exaggerating the danger. One pilot union estimates that the cockpit door is opened approximately 8 times during
an average flight; thats once every 20 minutes. Martens firm has developed a retractable screen that would shield the cockpit
door from passengers whenever it is opened. Crupaxs retractable screen is fitted to the cabin-side bulkhead of the forward
toilet as depicted in the illustration. This creates a security zone outside the cockpit. The screen is electronically interlocked
with the cockpit door so only one can be open at any time. Entry in and out of the cockpit is accomplished via fingerprint
scanners and a database that houses biometric data of all crewmembers. Therefore, no unauthorized person can open the door.
The Crupax Flight Deck Security System can be retrofitted to any jetliner
at a cost of around $50, 000; however, as yet, the system has not received certification. The screen is manufactured from
material originally developed to fortify cabin areas in race cars and is extremely strong. Unfortunately Martens has been
unable to garner any interest from regulators or airlines in the U.S. The current Administration has committed itself to the
air marshal program and refuses to acknowledge vulnerabilities that still exist in cockpit security.
Martens may be right. El Al, the most security conscious airline in the world,
has a double cockpit door system fitted to its airplanes; however, both doors are solid. The advantage Martens product has
over solid door alternatives is that the Crupax Flight Deck Security System can be easily retrofitted to all types of airplanes
in around 8 hours. In a tacit acknowledgment of cockpit vulnerability, Airbus has announced that it will be installing a solid
double door system on the A-380.
But a terrorist rushing the cockpit while the door is open is not the only
vulnerability pilots need worry about. Most passengers naively believe that cockpits are strongly fortified against terrorist
attacks, claims one U.S. airline captain. However, they are not aware that while airliner doors have been fortified against
intrusion, cockpit bulkheads have not. On many airplanes the forward restroom shares a common wall with the cockpit. This
might allow a terrorist surreptitious entry from the restroom. Until cockpit bulkheads are modified to withstand attempts
at intrusion the cockpit is not entirely safe.
When the author asked for a comment on the cockpit vulnerability issue from
Boeing, Jim Proulx, Communications Representative, remarked that [Boeing] will continue to work with regulatory agencies as
they examine any new requirements for security. In other words, nothing is currently being done to change the status quo.
Clearly if terrorists gain entry to the cockpit during flight pilots are the last line of defense; this has been the main
argument used for arming pilots.
Peter Swift, program manager for Quiet Wing Corporation, says that funding
future modifications will be a major hurdle to overcome. Airlines dont want to pay for it and passengers dont want to pay
for it either.
Whether the federal government pays, or whether passengers pay via higher
ticket prices, future modifications are critical to ensure cockpit safety.
Cockpit guns
Although Congress passed legislation allowing pilots to carry guns to date
there have only been a small percentage of applicants trained as Federal Flight Deck Officers. This is largely due to strict
guidelines and limited training facilities available for pilots. However, there
is still widespread reticence at arming pilots even among pilots themselves. Concerning the regions of Europe and Australasia,
one Qantas captain remarked, There hasnt even been any serious discussion about having guns in the cockpit. His comments were
echoed by a Canadian airline captain who said that Canadian pilots have not seriously discussed the issue either.
Despite some U.S. airlines having outlaid millions of dollars to purchase
Tasers a popular non-lethal stun gun preferred by many law enforcement agencies not one airline has been given approval to
install them in cockpits. According to Steve Tuttle, communications manager for Advanced Taser, airlines that have purchased
and trained pilots include United Airlines, Mesa Airlines, American Transair, and Korean Airlines.
Delay in approval of the use of Tasers in the cockpit seems to stem from
a fear of what a misfired high-voltage projectile might do to avionics systems. Cubbin says that fears of avionic system disruption
are outweighed by the fact that Tasers would only be used as a last resort. While ever the cockpit is vulnerable in any way
pilots must have the means to defend their lives, he says.
Communications
ARINC, a large communications organization, has developed eFlightDeck solution.
Sean Reilly, representative of ARINC, explained that a separate Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS)
processor is linked with an Electronic Flight Bag in the cockpit. Through this interface pilots can input an emergency signal
via a two-button press sequence. The signal is received by ARINCs ground stations around the world and forwarded immediately
to federal authorities. AIRINCs SkyLink system also provides broadband connection via satellite. Reilly says that the commercial
version available for airline installation has the capability of 512kbs uplink to the satellite and a downlink of up to 10mbs.
What this means is that, in an emergency situation, the on-board server can allow pilots to send streaming video off the aircraft.
According to JoAnn Metcalfe, AIRINCs communications manager, real time data link to AIRINCs communications centers and federal
authorities will enhance on-board security because in-flight emergencies will be immediately relayed to the ground. Metcalfe
reported that a major airline has chosen ARINCs system for fleet-wide installation; however, at time of writing, she was not
permitted to name the airline.
In Connexion by BoeingSM, high-speed Internet-based connectivity
for passengers with laptop computers can also be utilized to optimize efficiencies and enhance on-board security. British
Airways, Japan Airlines, and Scandinavian Airlines have all announced plans to equip their long-range jets with this system.
Proulx says that Boeing has completed a number of successful demonstrations of, how marshals aboard an airliner equipped with
real-time connectivity and personal wireless networking technologies could use hand-held devices to communicate directly with
counterparts, on the ground and elsewhere in the cabin, via voice, video, instant messaging and wireless alarms.
Any system that enhances communication is an asset to security officers on-board.
However, while these systems transmit hijack scenarios to federal authorities on the ground, for passengers and crew, this
may only magnify their peril. If on-board terrorist activity is detected fighter planes will be dispatched to intercept your
flight before arrival. In extreme circumstances your flight might be shot down. Being aware of this probability may incite
more passengers to help try and overcome terrorists in flight. After all, what have they got to lose?
WHY AIRLINES?
The reason airliners are such an attractive target for terrorists is simple: aviation is essential to domestic and
international commerce. While terrorists might strike other targets in the U.S. those attacks would be largely regionalized.
Only attacks on airlines cause a pervasive spread of terror across borders. As the attacks of 9/11 proved when passengers
avoid flying the entire global economy suffers. The U.S. economy alone is thought to have suffered losses of $100 billion
by mid-November, 2001. Terrorists hope that if they can create economic turmoil in western societies secular governments will
fall. Then Islamic fundamentalism can grow from its roots to displace the despotism of Western society.
This is problem that wont go away by itself. The threat of terrorism will be with us for many years to come. We must
not only accept this fact, but recognize that we are all are active agents in the war on terrorism.
WE NEED TO SPEED UP
To answer the question posed in this article: Are we there yet? The answer is, No, we are not. Not by a long shot.
In an amazingly short period of time the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in the U.S. has successfully
integrated significant security improvements into airline operations. These include better intelligence gathering, federalizing
airport screeners, testing checked baggage for explosives, fortifying cockpit doors, adding air marshals, allowing some pilots
to have guns, and biometric screening of international passengers. But as shown in this article, cockpits are still not safe,
crews are not receiving adequate training, and cargo holds are not fortified to reduce bomb damage.
It will be impossible to make airlines one hundred percent safe and still retain the freedom of movement that is an
essential element to efficient operations. Therefore, the aim should be to narrow all susceptible areas of operations so that
overlapping security measures make the chance of a successful attack almost negligible. And common sense should prevail. If
a new idea, such as the double cockpit door system, evolves that could make the cockpit safer and reduce the need for air
marshals why not adopt it swiftly?
With reference to CAPAs report card this means raising each element of security to the grade of B or better. Currently
CAPA says that the only two facets of security considered adequate are bag screening and cockpit doors. Those gradings are,
in the authors opinion, too high. Obviously cost is an issue, but the potential cost to the global economy of an attack on
the scale of 9/11 far outweighs whatever short-term outlays are necessary.
Terrorists have not hit the U.S. since 9/11, but some pundits think this is because al Qaeda wants to conduct an operation
whose impact would be more devastating than their last. With approximately 1600 international flights arriving daily in U.S.
cities authorities fear that terrorists might try and take advantage of inadequate security in some overseas airports to commandeer
a foreign airliner and use it as a weapon. This fear is what prompted Homeland
Security Secretary, Tom Ridge, to raise the level of security compliance of certain flights destined to the U.S. One government
official reported that non compliance would mean no clearance to land or fly through U.S. airspace. The largest growth in
terrorist groups sympathetic to al Qaeda is occurring in Southeast Asian countries that have high Muslim populations. As the 2003 commandeering of an ATC tower in Manila proved, airports in Asia may be
particularly susceptible to infiltration. Therefore, the U.S. must make certain that international airlines from this area
are screened extremely well.
The bottom line is that every facet of airline security ultimately affects on-board safety. And any failure that allows
terrorists to mount an attack on a jetliner while it is in flight could end up with you, the passenger, finding yourself in
the frontlines of the war on terrorism. Cubbin warns that all passengers need
to recognize this fact. It is incumbent on us all to be more alert, to act quickly and alert authorities when our suspicions
are aroused, and to join flight attendants to thwart terrorists if necessary. Were all in this together.
Removing any doubt of the omnipresence of danger, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri,
a top lieutenant of Osama bin Laden, warned in February, 2004, Bush, fortify your defenses and intensify your security measuresbecause
the Muslim nation, which sent brigades to New York and Washington, has decided to send you one brigade after another, carrying
death and seeking paradise.
Haunting words; are you ready?
Cubbin Consulting -- Airlines Economics, Marketing, Safety, Training and Project Management
