FLIGHT OF SAFETY

BY

KENNETH A. CUBBIN

A Brief Review:

Standard procedure for the MD-11 dictates that once smoke has been detected in the cabin, the captain and first officer don oxygen masks, establish communication and then attempt to isolate the source of smoke contamination. On the overhead panel of the MD-11 is a four position, rotary switch that was designed to expedite the process of establishing and isolating the source of smoke contamination. The first selection of the "Smoke Elect/Air" switch is labeled "3/1 OFF". This position isolates #3 generator and #1 engine bleed source. Among the items that receive power from #3 generator are the #2 and #3 VHF radios, #2 transponder, DFDR, and in some aircraft, the CVR. The checklist calls for the pilots to select another radio and transponder before turning the "Smoke Elect/Air" switch to the "3/1 OFF" position. If for some reason the pilots neglect to carry out this checklist instruction, then radio communication would be lost, there would be no operable transponder and the DFDR would cease recording. Curiously, 6 minutes before Swissair Flight 111 crashed into the sea, VHF communication with Halifax ATC ceased, the transponder went dead, and the DFDR stopped recording. It is quite possible that the captain and first officer on Swissair Flight 111 failed to select an alternate source for VHF communication and transponder before selecting the "Smoke Elect/Air" switch to "3/1 OFF".

Very few of us have had to face the same conditions as the captain and first officer of Swissair Flight 111. However, many of us have experienced similar conditions in the flight simulator. Remember if you can, how cumbersome and uncomfortable you felt with the smoke goggles and oxygen mask on your face. Remember how difficult it was to get the smoke goggles over your eye glasses; how difficult it was to purge the smoke from the goggles, and how difficult it was to communicate with other crew members and ATC. How many seconds did these endeavors take? Were you able to even think about the possible source of the smoke entering the cockpit while you were arranging your emergency face ware? Did you feel a little disoriented? How was your system knowledge recall under duress? Now factor in that during your experience the smoke was only simulated and subconsciously you understood that in an hour or so you would be sitting in the debriefing room drinking a cup of coffee.

For the purposes of presenting my argument as to how safety has been degraded by the removal of the flight engineer from large modern aircraft and for this purpose only I am going to assume that the above scenario actually occurred. If there had been a flight engineer aboard Swissair Flight 111, how could he have assisted? Would the crew have stood a better chance of survival?

A professional flight engineer (pfe) is a person who began his or her career as an aircraft maintenance engineer and is, therefore, enamored with the machine rather than the process of piloting. With years of practical experience of aircraft system operation, component location and various toxic fluids used in modern aircraft, the pfe has a more expansive "feel" for the source of aircraft malfunctions. It is possible that with this experience, a pfe could have had a more intuitive opinion as to the source of smoke contamination on Swissair Flight 111 and expedited the identification and isolation of the source. However, even if the flight engineer had been a third pilot, there would have been one extra opinion as to the smoke source.

In a three man crew configuration, when a malfunction occurs, the captain will usually delegate the first officer to fly the airplane and communicate with ATC while the captain and flight engineer complete the checklist. This method ensures that one person is focused on flying, complying with ATC instructions and maintaining the airplane within safety parameters. The two persons completing the checklist ensures confirmation of switches operated, verification of all checklist items and a less stressful cockpit environment. If a flight engineer had been part of the Swissair Flight 111 flight crew, then the checklist item requiring pre-selection of alternate VHF radio and transponder sources before operating the "Smoke Elect/Air" switch to "3/1 OFF" position may not have been overlooked.

Cockpit Resource Management training within a three man crew concept encourages the captain to utilize all resources available to him in emergency situations. Given the Swissair Flight 111 captains decision to jettison fuel, that procedure could have been delegated to the flight engineer. Communication with the cabin crew members could have also been delegated to the flight engineer. In a three man crew configuration, the ability to further share the load under duress, reduces stress on the captain and allows him precious room in which to make decisions and calculate his flight profile. In fact, if there had been three crew members instead of just two on board Swissair Flight 111, then the questionable decision to jettison fuel first before landing would more likely have been challenged and discussed.

I have utmost respect for the pilots who operate two man crew large aircraft. However, these aircraft are extremely complex and it is unreasonable to expect a pilot to have an intricate knowledge required for piloting his or her airplane as well as extensive mechanical knowledge. The MD-11 and B-747-400 aircraft were not simplified when the decision was made to relegate flight engineer duties to computers; aircraft systems remained largely unchanged from their predecessors. When everything is working well, there are usually no problems. However, when emergency situations arise there is little doubt that system knowledge, a third set of eyes, and another crew member to share in delegation of duties are a real asset. Since air traffic is rapidly reaching critical levels at major airports, emergency situations on board aircraft will become increasingly tenuous.

I predict that this is not the last accident that will reinforce the poor decision that was made to remove the flight engineer from modern large aircraft. Realistically, however, having made the decision to remove the flight engineer, there is little chance of a reversal. Therefore, what is now a very serious safety problem aboard two man crew large aircraft today will be accentuated in the future with the advent of even larger and more complex aircraft such as the A3XX planned by Airbus Industries.

Also exacerbating the degradation of safety is the desire of aircraft manufacturers and airlines to extend the two-engine aircraft ETOPS approval more than 180 minutes. In the future, if two engine, two man crew aircraft are permitted to fly on routes such as Los Angeles - Tokyo, then it is only a matter of time before there is a ditching at sea. Mathematically there is more likelihood of a two engine failure occurring than a three or four engine failure. In a two man crew configuration there is also a higher probability on a two engine aircraft of shutting down the wrong engine when an engine failure occurs.

There are many pilots who agree with me on these issues but are reticent to voice an unpopular opinion. Studies have been completed that show advanced aircraft have not significantly reduced the aircraft accident rate. To my knowledge none of these studies has attempted to define the effect of removing the flight engineer from the cockpit of advanced aircraft. Perhaps it is time to reconsider a poor decision.